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This paper investigates the hypothesis that the extent to which hysteresis occurs in the 
aftermath of recessions depends on monetary policy reactions. The degree of hysteresis is 
explained econometrically by the extent of monetary easing during a recession and by 
standard variables for labour market institutions in a pooled cross-country analysis using 
quarterly data. The sample includes 40 recessions in 19 OECD countries for which the 
required data is available. The time period lasts from 1980 to 2007. The paper builds on Ball 
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The Impact of Monetary Policy on Unemployment 
Hysteresis 
 
1  Introduction 
 
Can Central Banks affect structural unemployment? The ECB’s answer is a resounding no. 
“Real income or the level of employment in the economy are, in the long run, essentially 
determined by real (supply-side) factors ([…] welfare policies and other regulations 
determining the flexibility of markets […])” (ECB, 2004, p. 41). On the other hand, Olivier 
Blanchard, Chief Economist of the IMF, argues that “monetary policy affects both the actual 
and the natural rate of unemployment” (Blanchard, 2003, p. 4). A look at the development of 
unemployment over time suggests that unemployment is growing in steps. As can be seen in 
Figure 1, unemployment is growing dramatically during recessions. While unemployment 
returns to pre-recession levels in some countries, it does not in others. These countries also 
experience an increase in the NAIRU. The hypothesis to be explored is that monetary policy 
explains an important part of these different patterns. 
 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
 
Monetary policy affects economic activity through several channels including interest rates, 
bank credits, asset prices, exchange rates and expectations (Mishkin, 1996; ECB, 2004). 
Romer and Romer (1994) have argued that monetary policy has been the key variable to end 
recessions. There is also substantial evidence that monetary policy is most effective during 
recessions (Lo/Piger, 2005). Peersman and Smets (2001) find for large European countries 
that the effect of an interest rate shock on output almost doubles during a recession. This 
suggests that monetary policy reactions may be important in understanding the behaviour of 
unemployment over time.  
 
In a well known paper, Laurence Ball (1999) found that differences in monetary policy during 
recessions of the early 1980s explain a substantial part of how much of the cyclical increase in 
unemployment has become structural. His study was based on an in-depth analysis of selected   2
countries and on econometric analysis which covered the recessions of 17 OECD countries in 
the early 1980s. 
 
This paper takes Ball’s approach as a starting point and updates and extends it. A pooled 
cross-country analysis with quarterly data is used to investigate the impact of a reduction in 
short-term real interest rates during a recession on the NAIRU five years later (relative to the 
maximum increase in unemployment during the recession). This paper extends Ball’s (1999) 
analysis along four dimensions. First the sample is significantly extended by investigating the 
recessions of OECD countries between 1980 and 2003. Second, quarterly rather than annual 
data is used to measure the period of recessions and the reaction of monetary policy. Third, a 
richer set of labour market institutions is controlled for. Fourth, several tests of robustness are 
performed by varying the definition of key variables.  
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses briefly the theory behind the 
structural rate of unemployment, the NAIRU. Section 3 surveys the relevant empirical 
literature explaining unemployment and the NAIRU. Section 4 continues with methodology 
and data issues. In Section 5 the results of the econometric analysis are presented. Section 6 
addresses several tests of robustness, and Section 7 concludes. 
 
2  The NAIRU theory and unemployment hysteresis 
 
The NAIRU is defined as the rate of unemployment at which inflation is stable. Sometimes it 
is referred to as long-run or structural unemployment. If unemployment drops below the 
NAIRU, workers can achieve a higher rate of growth of money wages in wage bargaining, 
which in turn leads firms to increase the growth rate of prices. Rising inflation will again 
cause rising nominal wage claims and trigger a wage-price spiral (e.g. Layard et al., 1991; 
Carlin and Soskice, 2006). 
 
The NAIRU model is a rather general macroeconomic framework, for which different 
interpretations exist. In particular there is a debate on the determinants of the NAIRU itself 
and on the disequilibrium dynamics (Stockhammer, 2008). According to the New Consensus 
Model, Central Banks (assuming they follow a Taylor Rule or are inflation-targeting) will 
react to the wage-price spiral by raising real interest rates. It is generally assumed that the 
Central Bank is able to increase (short-term) real interest rates via the variation of (short-term)   3
nominal interest rates. The increased interest rates will affect real output negatively and 
increase unemployment. Rising unemployment deteriorates the bargaining position of 
workers and makes income claims of workers and employers compatible. This mechanism is 
assumed to work symmetrically so that Central Banks are able to stimulate growth by 
lowering interest rates. 
 
The level of the NAIRU is determined ceteris paribus by the degree of competition on goods 
markets, which influences the profit claims, and labour market institutions, such as the 
generosity and duration of unemployment benefits, the tax wedge, or employment protection 
legislation, which influence the wage claims. According to what one might call the exogeneity 
view these are the only determinants of the NAIRU. This interpretation is expressed in the 
opening quotation from the ECB and is also associated with the OECD which has used it in 
its early recommendations to argue that inflexible labour markets are the reason for 
persistently high unemployment in Europe (OECD, 1994).  
 
Alternative interpretations emphasize the endogeneity of the NAIRU. Endogeneity is either 
rooted in economic variables which simultaneously affect actual unemployment and the 
NAIRU or in hysteresis which means that actual unemployment influences the NAIRU. In the 
latter case the unemployment rate serves as an attractor for the NAIRU and demand policy 
which influences unemployment will also (indirectly) affect the NAIRU.  
 
Several explanations for hysteresis have been put forward. First, in the insider-outsider model 
it is assumed that the labour force is divided between these two groups, the insiders and 
outsiders: employed vs. unemployed, highly qualified vs. less qualified, trade union members 
vs. non-trade union members, etc. While the insiders have a strong position in wage 
bargaining, e.g. because of their firm specific know-how, the outsider group is not a perfect 
competitor for the insider-position and has therefore little or no influence on the wage 
bargaining process. In this case a higher unemployment rate may not have any impact on 
wages (Blanchard and Summers, 1986). Second, deskilling of the long-term unemployed may 
make them imperfect substitutes for employed workers: 
 
“The higher is the proportion of long-term unemployment in the overall pool of 
unemployment, the less impact will any given level of unemployment have on wage 
setting. If this is the case, then since a long period of high unemployment is likely to 
eventually push up the proportion of the long-term unemployed, equilibrium 
unemployment will rise.” (Carlin and Soskice, 2006, p. 119)   4
 
Third, fairness considerations can give rise to endogenous wage aspirations (Skott, 2005). If 
workers’ view of the appropriate wage level is determined by prevailing wages, 
unemployment may not be able to affect wages.
1 These explanations give reasons why a 




There are also some macroeconomic variables that may affect the NAIRU itself. Among 
these, two prominent factors are capital accumulation and the interest rate. Capital scrapping 
during long-lasting recessions will lead to a decline in the capital stock (in parallel with rising 
unemployment). If there is limited (ex-post) substitutability between capital and labour, a 
positive demand shock will have inflationary effects at lower levels of employment – the 
NAIRU has risen (Rowthorn, 1995, 1999; Bean, 1989). Increases in the interest rate may 
affect the NAIRU directly because it may increase firms’ target mark up (Hein, 2006) and it 
will have a negative effect on capital accumulation. 
 
Keynesian economists thus interpret the NAIRU not as the long-run equilibrium rate of 
unemployment, but as a short-term inflation barrier, which shifts with economic activity and 
depends on the real rate of interest (Arestis and Sawyer, 2005; Hein, 2004, 2006; Lavoie, 
2006; Stockhammer, 2008). 
 
3  A survey of the empirical literature 
 
The view that differences in unemployment across countries and over time can be explained 
by changes in labour market institutions has been forcefully put forward by the OECD Jobs 
Study (OECD, 1994) and since shaped policy making. While this view is at times almost 
treated as an economic fact, the available evidence is surprisingly mixed. IMF (2003) and 
Nickell et al. (2005) report strong effects of labour market institutions on unemployment.
3 
Others (to be discussed presently) are much more sceptical. What is at stake is not whether 
labour market institutions influence the NAIRU – this view is generally shared – but whether 
                                                 
1 The near-rationality approach of Akerlof et al. (2000) and Akerlof (2007) leads to similar policy conclusions 
regarding the influence of monetary policy on the long-run Phillips curve. 
2 Additional explanations for hysteresis are summarized in Røed (1997). 
3 For a critical discussion of OECD (1994) see OECD (2006), especially chapter 6, and Blanchard and Katz 
(1997). For a critical discussion of IMF (2003) see Baker et al. (2004), Freeman (2005) and Baccaro and Rei 
(2007).   5
they can be regarded as the prime determinants of actual unemployment (and the NAIRU). 
For example Fitoussi et al. find “that the institutional reforms in the OECD proposal can only 
be a small part of the story. In several countries, such as Ireland, equilibrium unemployment 
has fallen in the absence of net reform, in our estimation, whereas in others the net reform has 
apparently not affected equilibrium unemployment significantly” (Fitoussi et al., 2000, p. 
257). Similar conclusions are drawn by Blanchard and Katz (1997), Baker et al. (2005) and 
Freeman (2005). Remarkably, the OECD Employment Outlook 2006 acknowledges that 
highly different combinations of institutional settings can result in low unemployment 
(OECD, 2006). 
 
Hysteresis suggests a different approach to explaining differences in unemployment: demand 
shocks will determine unemployment and the NAIRU will be dragged along. There is a rich 
empirical literature testing for the existence (or absence) of hysteresis. In their pioneer work, 
Blanchard and Summers (1986) find evidence for unemployment hysteresis in the European 
countries. They estimate the impact of lagged employment and unemployment in wage 
equations for the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and the United States, for the period 
1953 to 1984, where the combination of ‘bad times’ with rigid labour markets seems to be the 
main source of hysteresis. Several other surveys find evidence for the hysteresis explanation 
of unemployment especially in European countries, less often for the United States, by testing 
for a unit root in the unemployment rate (Mitchell, 1993; Røed, 1996; León-Ledesma, 2002). 
Stanley (2004) performs a meta-regression analysis of 24 publications with 99 regressions on 
the determinants of unemployment and finds a persistence coefficient of past unemployment 
of 0.86. The coefficient rises to 0.96 after weighting the small sample biased-results according 
to their quality. This value is close to unity which indicates full hysteresis.  
 
When structural changes in the stationarity tests are allowed for, the null hypothesis of a unit 
root in unemployment is often rejected (Arestis and Biefang-Frisancho Mariscal, 1999; Papell 
et al., 2000; Camarero et al., 2006). However, these results also suggest that structural breaks 
are crucial to describe the development of unemployment over time and “that shocks have 
highly persistent […] effects on unemployment” (Camarero et al., 2006, p. 180). Using a 
similar approach León-Ledesma and McAdam (2004) argue that it is difficult to distinguish 
transition effects and hysteresis in empirical research.  
   6
Jaeger and Parkinson (1994) apply an unobserved components analysis using a Kalman-filter 
to decompose unemployment into a structural component and a cyclical component and find 
evidence for hysteresis in Canada, Germany and the UK, but not for the USA. The impact of 
lagged cyclical unemployment on the NAIRU is interpreted as hysteresis. A similar approach 
is followed by Logeay and Tober (2005) who find a strong impact of hysteresis in explaining 
the rise of the NAIRU in the Euro-zone. 
 
One important stream of the literature links unemployment to capital accumulation. Rowthorn 
(1995) regresses (the changes in) unemployment on (the changes in) capital accumulation in a 
cross-section of OECD countries and finds that capital accumulation is able to explain 
employment at a statistically significant level. Stockhammer (2004) tests the mainstream and 
Keynesian views in explaining unemployment for Germany, Italy, France, UK and the USA 
using a time-series approach. He finds that the rate of accumulation has a statistically 
significant effect, controlling for capacity utilisation and several labour market institutions. 
Arestis et al. (2007), using time-series and panel data, find evidence that the capital stock is an 
important determinant of unemployment and wages in EMU countries.  
 
Several studies have found that interest rates have important effects on unemployment. Based 
on a regression explaining the change in unemployment between the 1980s and the 1990s in 
19 OECD countries, Fitoussi et al. (2000, p. 259) find that “changes in the domestic (short-
term) real rate of interest go hand in hand with changes in average unemployment.” Blanchard 
and Wolfers (2000) present a panel investigation for 20 OECD countries, and highlight the 
interaction of macroeconomic shocks and institutions. They also find strong effects of real 
interest rates and conclude that the real interest rate can affect the NAIRU through capital 
accumulation. IMF (2003) includes some macroeconomic variables next to various labour 
market institutions in panel regressions explaining unemployment (for 20 OECD countries 
from 1960 to 1998) and finds that the real interest rate as well as a measure of Central Bank 
independence show a positive and highly significant impact on unemployment. Bassanini and 
Duval (2006) perform a panel analysis for 21 OECD countries over the period 1982 to 2003 
and find that besides some labour market institutions, the long-run real interest rate has a 
statistically significant impact on unemployment. 
   7
With respect to the influence of monetary policy on output there is substantial evidence that 
monetary policy has asymmetric effects.
4 Peersman and Smets (2001) estimate an area-wide 
VAR for the years 1978-1998 and combine their results with a multivariate Markov Switching 
Model which allows them to endogenously determine booms and recessions and to test if the 
effects of policy depend on the state of the economy. They find for 7 EMU countries that 
effects of monetary policy “are significantly larger in a recession compared to those in an 
expansion” (Peersman/Smets, 2001, p. 12). Similar conclusions have been reached for the 
Euro-zone (Maria-Dolores 2002), as well as for several individual countries including the 
USA (Garcia/Schaller, 2002; Lo/Piger, 2005), Germany (Kakes, 2000; Kuzin/Tober, 2004) 
and Spain (Dolado/Maria-Dolores, 2001). 
 
Combining these results with the literature highlighting the role of shocks in explaining 
unemployment, Laurence Ball (1999) focuses on the role of monetary policy in recessions 
when explaining structural unemployment. First Ball analyzes the effect of monetary policy in 
the recessions of the early 1980s by using descriptive statistics based on quarterly data for the 
G7 countries and by means of regression analysis for 17 OECD countries (using annual data). 
Second, to account for differences in the decrease in unemployment rates he discusses 
monetary policy and labour market policies in four successful countries and six countries with 
disappointing performance. Ball concludes that “[m]onetary policy and other determinants of 
aggregate demand have long-run effects on unemployment. Throughout the OECD, the 
reactions of policy to recessions in the early 1980s helped determine whether unemployment 
rose temporarily or permanently.” (Ball, 1999, p. 234) 
 
The sample of his econometric analysis is rather small as it includes only the 17 recessions of 
the early 1980s. There has been surprisingly little effort to check whether Ball’s results can be 
generalized, i.e. to apply his approach to other periods. This is where this paper comes in. 
This paper broadly follows Ball’s econometric approach in analysing recession episodes. It 
extends his analysis along four dimensions. First we extend the sample by investigating the 
recessions of OECD countries between the 1980s and the early 2000s. This constitutes the 
most important step in the attempt to check the validity of Ball’s results. In using a much 
broader and more diverse sample, we move well beyond the experience of the recessions of 
                                                 
4 Theoretically these results are based on the financial accelerator model of Bernanke and Gertler (1989) or on 
convex short-run aggregate supply curves (see Peersman/Smets, 2001 and Kuzin/Tober, 2004). Additionally 
some authors focus on the psychological effects of the behaviour of monetary policy authorities in recessions 
(Blanchard, 2003).   8
the early 1980s, which are often regarded as having been engineered by Central Banks. 
Second, we use quarterly instead of annual data to measure the period of recessions and the 
reaction of monetary policy. This allows for a more exact determination of the monetary 
response to recessions. Third, a richer set of labour market institutions is controlled for. While 
Ball controls econometrically only for unemployment benefits (and discusses the tax wedge in 
his case studies), we utilize a broad set of nine labour market institutions employing the latest 
OECD dataset. Fourth, several tests of robustness are performed to investigate whether results 
are sensitive to minor changes in definitions. 
 
4  Methodology and data 
 
The hypothesis to be tested is that restrictive behaviour of monetary policy during the 
recession will trigger a hysteresis effect: the cyclical increase in unemployment will become 
permanent and result in an increase in structural unemployment in the period after the 
recession. The increase in the NAIRU in different countries and time periods will be affected 
by the severity of recessions. Thus the dependent variable will be the increase in the NAIRU 
relative to the increase in unemployment, rather than the increase in the NAIRU itself. In the 
econometric analysis this degree of hysteresis will be explained by the extent of monetary 
easing, labour market institutions and other control variables.  
 
ε + + + + = T b C b L b ME b H 4 3 2 1  
 
Where H, ME, L, C, and T are the degree of hysteresis, monetary easing, a vector of labour 
market institutions, a vector of other control variables and a vector of time dummies, 
respectively. 
 
A recession is defined here as two or more consecutive quarters of decline in real GDP and an 
increase in unemployment.
5 The first part of this definition follows convention. The additional 
requirement that unemployment has to increase is necessary for our dependent variable to 
have a meaningful interpretation. Only in one case (Italy 2001) is there a GDP recession 
without an increase in unemployment. As some recessions are followed by a short recovery 
                                                 
5 The NBER Business Cycle Dating Committee “gives relatively little weight to real GDP because it is only 
measured quarterly and it is subject to continuing, large revisions” (Business Cycle Dating Committee 2001, 
p. 1). Unfortunately their classification is only available for the USA.   9
period, and then return to negative rates of output growth, we treat two recessions within an 
eight quarter period as the same recession. 
 
The dependent variable is the degree of hysteresis (H). It is defined as the increase in the 
NAIRU ( N u Δ ) in the 5 years after the peak of the business cycle relative to the maximum 
increase in actual unemployment ( u
max Δ ) in the same period ( u u H N
max /Δ Δ = ). More 
technically, the numerator is the change in the OECD’s (ex post) NAWRU from the (mean of 
four quarters prior to the) beginning of the recession to (the mean of four quarters) five years 
later.
6 If within these five years (but not in the first two years) another recession begins, the 
period is shortened so that those recessions (and their following periods) are not overlapping. 
The denominator of the degree of hysteresis is the greatest increase in actual unemployment 
from the quarter before the recession to at most 18 quarters later (for all countries in the 
sample quarterly data is available). 
 
The degree of hysteresis measures the degree of the rise in actual unemployment during a 
recession which has become structural. If this variable is zero, this means that the NAIRU 
remained unchanged, and the recession did not lead to a rise in structural unemployment. If its 
value is one, this means that an increase in unemployment directly translates into an increase 
in the NAIRU. 
 
Monetary easing is the cumulated change of the ex post short-term real interest rate per 
quarter between the first quarter of the recession and the second quarter after the recession. In 
these last two quarters growth rates are positive again, but absolute values of output are still 
below trend in most cases.
7 Monetary policy is expected to show an especially strong impact 
in this vulnerable period. The real interest rate is constructed (as in Ball 1999) as the nominal 
short-term interest rate (it) minus the average consumer price inflation in the periods t(-4) to t(-
1) and t(-3) to t. 
 
                                                 
6 In five cases (Belgium, Switzerland, Denmark, Spain and Portugal) only annual NAWRU-data are available. 
Here, the starting point was chosen according to the quarter of the year in which the recession started. If the 
recession started in the first or second quarter of a year, the NAWRU from the year before to five years later was 
measured. If the recession started in the third or fourth quarter of the year, the NAWRU from this year to five 
years later was measured. As the NAWRU obtained by a Kalman filter is by design very smooth, for countries 
where quarterly data are available the results with both procedures are virtually identical. 
7 And in several cases output growth becomes positive after a recession for one, two or more quarters, and then 
returns to negative growth again. Therefore the quarters after the recession also seem to be crucial.   10
The real interest rate has an impact on various economic variables, but it is not strictly a 
policy-controlled variable. The analysis presupposes that (during a recession) changes in the 
real interest rate are driven by changes in nominal rates rather than inflation. Moreover, our 
sample includes countries that are part of the Euro area and have lost the ability to 
autonomously set interest rates. Rather, they will be affected by different real interest rates 
that result from the same Euro area-wide nominal interest rate. This indeed has been the case 
in the recessions of the early 2000s. In the 2002 recession, real interest rates were 0.93 in 
Germany, but -0.52 in Portugal. We will return to the issue of real and nominal interest rates 
in section 6. 
 
In line with the relevant literature we use various indicators for labour market institutions as 
control variables: active labour market spending per unemployed to GDP per capita (ALMP), 
employment protection legislation (EPL), product market regulation (PMR), tax wedge (TW) 
union density (UD), unemployment benefit duration in years (UBD), average unemployment 
benefit replacement rate (UBR), as well as a dummy for high (HIGHCORP) and low 
corporatism (LOWCORP).
8 The labour market institutions variables were taken in levels at 




A high level of spending on active labour market policy is expected to decrease the degree of 
hysteresis, therefore a negative sign is expected. For the other labour market institution 
variables a high level should correlate with a high degree of hysteresis. The dummies for high 
as well as low corporatism are expected to decrease the degree of hysteresis, while 
intermediate corporatism is expected to result in high hysteresis. Finally to control for other 
macroeconomic shocks the change in the terms of trade (d_TOT) was included. This is the 
weighted change of import prices relative to domestic prices from the beginning of the 
recession to (maximal) five years later. A reduction in relative import prices should reduce 
wage pressure and, eventually, the degree of hysteresis (see e.g. Layard et al., 1991; Bassanini 
and Duval, 2006). 
 
                                                 
8 Product market regulation is, strictly speaking, not a labour market institution. It is supposed to impact upon the 
NAIRU because it has an effect on firms’ mark up and is routinely included in unemployment regressions. 
9 Detail descriptions of these data can be found in Appendix 2 of Bassanini and Duval (2006). The time series 
start with 1982 and are ending with 2003. In several cases the ALMP-series starts some years later and ends 
some years earlier. Where the observed recessions started before 1982 and in the case of ALMP the closest 
available value is taken.    11
Quarterly data for output, short-term interest rates, the consumer price index, unemployment 
and the NAWRU are from the OECD Economic Outlook (volume 2007, release 02).
10 The 
data set includes all recessions beginning between 1980 and 2003 for 19 OECD countries. 
Greece, Austria, Luxembourg and Iceland had to be excluded due to lack of data.
11 Turkey, 
Mexico, Republic of Korea and the eastern European countries were excluded because their 
economies are structurally very different. The total number of observations is 40.
12 
 
5  Empirical results 
 
Table 1 summarizes the estimation results. Several specifications are reported. For some of 
these the White-Test indicated heteroskedasticity.
13 If this is the case, t-values are based on 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. Specifications 1 through 3 differ with respect to 
the time dummies included. Specifications 4 through 14 include different sets of labour 
market institutions.  
 
Specification 1 includes all labour market institutions and no time dummies. Specification 2 
includes time dummies t1, t2 and t3, which take on the value one if the recessions began in 
the period 1980-1986, 1987-95 and 1996-2003 respectively. These dummy variables should 
capture changes in the international environment or changes common to all countries that are 
not adequately captured by the control variables. It turns out that the values for t1 and t2 are 
virtually identical and differ substantially from t3. Therefore specification 3 includes an 
intercept and only t3. This specification then forms the basis for further variations of the 
specifications. ME is statistically significant at the 1% level in all reported specifications. 
Among the labour market institutions PMR and d_TOT are statistically significant and show 
                                                 
10 In the case of Ireland the OECD-data was complemented with data form the IMF International Financial 
Statistics for the quarterly short-term interest rate until 1983q4. 
11 The quarterly GDP data for Greece are unreliable according to the OECD Help Desk and no labour market 
institutions data are available. No quarterly GDP data is available for Austria. No data on labour market 
institutions is available for Luxembourg and Iceland. No quarterly data are available for Germany prior to 1991, 
as a consequence the German recession 1991/92 had to be excluded.  
12 Two observations had to be excluded. The degree of hysteresis is designed such that the variable lies between 
0 and 1. Indeed this is the case for most countries. However there are some exceptions. The Finnish recession in 
2001 shows a degree of hysteresis of -17.2. This is because the NAIRU was decreasing by 1.3 percent points, 
while the unemployment rate rose slightly by 0.07 percent points. Also, the Norwegian recession of 1980 is a 
statistical outlier as the monetary easing indicator lies more than three and a half standard deviations under the 
mean. The Finnish case results from definitions used and thus illustrates the limitations of this approach.  
13 As the critical value for not rejecting the null hypothesis of no heteroskedasticity we choose a probability 
value of 0.15.   12
the expected sign in specification 1. But in specification 2 and 3 both are insignificant and 
PMR even changes its sign. The adjusted R-squared varies between 29 and 41%. 
 
Insert Table 1 about here 
 
The variables for labour market institutions could be correlated among each other as they may 
measure different aspects of a given welfare regime. The lack of statistically significant 
effects may thus be due to multicollinearity problems. PMR and UD, and TW and EPL are the 
only two variable pairs that show correlation coefficient of above 0.5 (see Table A.2). 
Specification 4 thus drops PMR and TW to check whether the low level of statistical 
significance was due to multicollinearity. This is not the case. In specification 4 only d_TOT 
gains statistical significance (at the 10% level with the expected sign) and its coefficient 
estimate shows similar values as in the previous specifications. Finally specifications 5 
through 14 include the labour market institution variables one by one. Only TW and d_TOT 
show a statistically significant impact with the expected sign, the former at the 10% level the 
latter at the 5% level. For the rest of the labour market control variables no statistically 
significant effect in determining the degree of hysteresis was found. The other variables 
consistently show t-values well below 1. 
 
The variable of main interest, monetary easing, shows a statistically significant impact at the 
1% level on the degree of hysteresis in all specifications. The coefficient has the expected 
sign and varies between 0.52 and 0.70, with the preferred estimate (specification 3) being 
0.69. Economically this is a substantial effect. On average the countries in the sample reduced 
their real interest rates by 0.22 percent points each quarter of the monetary easing period. 
Taking the preferred estimate of ME, a one standard deviation change in monetary easing 
(0.39) reduces the degree of hysteresis by 0.27. This is roughly half of the standard deviation 
of the dependent variable.  
 
6  Robustness 
 
To check the robustness of these results, several tests were performed. First, different 
variations of the definition of the monetary easing period were tried. This period was initially 
defined as starting in the first quarter of a recession and ending two quarters after the 
recession. In variation 1 the monetary easing period was redefined so that it starts in the first   13
quarter of a recession, but ends one quarter after the recession (like in Romer and Romer, 
1994). In this variation only ME is statistically significant in explaining the degree of 
hysteresis (see Table 2). Specification 15 includes all control variables, while specification 16 
is without PMR and TW. The coefficient varies between 0.34 and 0.38, which is somewhat 
lower than in the baseline version. 
 
Insert Table 2 about here 
 
Second, this monetary easing period was redefined so that it starts one quarter before the 
recession (and ends two quarters after the recession). It could be argued that this quarter 
before the actual beginning of the recession is also of importance for anticyclical stabilization 
policy as interest rate shocks take time to become effective. Results with this alternative 
definition of the monetary easing period are reported in Table 2 (specification 17 and 18). In 
both specifications ME and d_TOT are statistically significant and show the expected sign. 
Again, the other control variables do not show a significant impact. The coefficient of ME 
ranges between 0.78 and 0.85, which is slightly higher than in the baseline version.  
 
Variation 3 measures inflation by the GDP-deflator (OECD data) instead of the consumer 
price index. In specification 19 in Table 2, including all control variables, no explanatory 
variable is statistically significant. After excluding PMR and TW (specification 20) the ME 
becomes statistically significant at the 10% level. If control variables are included 
individually ME is statistically significant in eight of this ten specifications (four times at the 
5% level and four times at the 10% level). Also TW is statistically significant (see Table A. 3). 
The coefficient of ME varies between 0.29 and 0.42, which is slightly lower than in the 
baseline version. 
 
Fourth, the definition of the real interest rates is altered to allow for forward-looking inflation 
expectations. In the baseline version real interest rates are defined as the nominal interest rates 
minus the average consumer price inflation in the periods t(-4) to t(-1) and t(-3) to t. This 
definition assumes adaptive expectations. But literature on monetary policy often stresses that 
economic agents are forward-looking (e.g. Clarida et al. 1999). As a simple way to a more 
forward-looking definition of inflation expectations, we assume that expected inflation is a 
weighted average of past and (actual) future inflation. The average consumer price inflation in 
the period t(-2) to t(+2) is used. The results of this fourth variation again show a statistically   14
significant impact of ME, at the 10% level also of d_TOT, and in one specification of EPL 
(see Table 2, Specification 21 and 22).
14 The coefficient of ME varies between 0.41 and 0.46, 
which lies somewhere between the baseline version and variation 1.  
 
In variation 5 the changes in labour market institutions (from the year when the recession 
started to five years later) rather than their levels are included. The coefficients estimates for 
monetary easing as well as their statistical significance are again robust against this variation 
(see Table 2, specification 23). The coefficient of ME lies at 0.66. EPL and UD show a 
statistically significant impact, but with a perverse sign.  
 
Overall the results seem reasonably robust against variations in the definitions. In general, ME 
shows a significant impact in the different variations and specifications. But hardly any 
control variable besides the change in terms of trade shows a statistically significant impact 
on the degree of hysteresis. 
 
As noted earlier, real interest rates can be an inaccurate measure for monetary policy because 
real interest rates may be driven by inflation differences rather than by differences in policy-
determined nominal rates. One important question is whether the monetary easing variable is 
indeed measuring Central Bank behaviour. Figure 2 plots the monetary easing indicator 
relative to the change in the nominal interest rates in the same period. They are clearly 
correlated. The outlier on the left above the regression line is Ireland during its recession in 
the early 1980s. Without this outlier the correlation coefficient lies at 0.62. It is thus plausible 
to assume that (during our recession episodes) changes in real interest rates are mainly driven 
by changes in nominal interest rates.  
 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
 
The monetary easing variable in the regression analysis is the change in real interest rates. 
Therefore countries in the Euro area with different levels of the real interest rates may 
experience the same extent of monetary easing due to changes in monetary policy. In the 2002 
recession, real interest rates were 0.94 in Germany, but -0.53 in Portugal. However, their 
respective values for monetary easing were -0.20 and -0.14; thus much more similar. 
Including the level of real (ex-post) short-term interest rates in the regression specification 
                                                 
14 In this specifications consist of 41 observations, as Norway is not an outlier according to this definition of real 
interest rates.   15
reported in the previous sections does not alter the results, nor is the level of the interest rate 
statistically significant. Therefore, what matters in explaining the degree of hysteresis is the 
change in real interest rates in the recessions, not their level. 
 
7  Conclusion 
 
This paper investigated the hypothesis that the extent to which unemployment hysteresis 
occurs in the aftermath of recessions depends on monetary policy reactions. The degree of 
hysteresis was regressed on monetary easing, standard labour market institution variables and 
a terms of trade shock. The results of the econometric analysis suggest strong effects of 
monetary policy, and depending on the specification also of the change in the terms of trade, 
but weak (if any) effects of labour market institutions during recession periods. Those 
countries which more aggressively reduced their real interest rates in the vulnerable period of 
a recession experienced a much smaller increase in the NAIRU (relative to the maximum 
increase of unemployment) five years later.  
 
While these results may go against conventional wisdom, and certainly against the wisdom of 
the ECB, it is in line with much of the economic literature. Fitoussi et al. find that “monetary 
policy across countries made a difference for their unemployment experience over the course 
of the decade” (Fitoussi et al., 2000, pp. 259-260). Similarly Blanchard argues that “real 
interest rates appear to play an important role in accounting for the evolution of the natural 
rate of unemployment” (Blanchard, 2000, p. 297). 
 
Our findings have important policy implications. If disinflationary monetary policy has 
lasting effects on unemployment, inflation-targeting (as opposed to a mixture of inflation and 
unemployment targeting) has high and permanent social costs. Central Banks should respond 
actively to recessions. 
 
In the Euro area, one interest rate is the monetary policy instrument for many different 
economies. It has been widely observed that the same monetary policy translates into rather 
different levels of the real interest rate in different countries. Our analysis highlighted the 
crucial role of monetary easing, that is, the change  in real interest rates. This has two 
implications for the conduct of monetary policy in the Euro area. First, if recessions are 
synchronized, monetary policy may still be able to achieve the same extent of monetary   16
easing in countries with different inflation rates because changes in real interest rates in times 
of recession typically depend primarily on changes in nominal rates. Monetary policy may 
still be effective under these circumstances. The second implication is that if countries enter 
recession at different times (and even a few quarters may make a big difference here) 
monetary policy can become ineffective. While inflation differences may present a challenge 
for the effectiveness of monetary policy by the ECB, the lack of synchronization of the 
business cycles may be the prime challenge in bad times. 
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Figure 1: The change in unemployment from the quarter before the beginning of the recession 
to 28 quarters later in selected countries 
 
Source: OECD 2007 
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Note: The values concerning euro-countries after the euro-introduction are symbolized with triangles; they belong to 
Portugal, Ireland, Germany and Belgium. 
Source: OECD 2007, IFS 2007 Table 1: Determinants of the degree of hysteresis 
 1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10    11    12    13    14   
ME 0.517***  0.686***  0.687***  0.699***  0.565***  0.593***  0.548***  0.572***  0.561***  0.571***  0.559***  0.579***  0.580***  0.652*** 
t-stat 2.937  3.701  3.712  4.281  3.422  3.816  3.165  3.647  3.392  4.026  3.322  3.830  3.461  5.608 
ALMP -0.002  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  0.000                                     
t-stat -0.610  -0.337  -0.415  -0.339  -0.148                                     
EPL -0.039  0.095  0.074  0.123      0.060                                 
t-stat -0.341  0.793  0.607  1.656      0.939                                 
PMR 0.141**  -0.015  0.007              0.021                             
t-stat 2.462  -0.138  0.068              0.302                             
TW 0.012  0.005  0.006                  0.013*                         
t-stat 1.193  0.466  0.559                  1.941                         
UBD -0.270  -0.220  -0.231  -0.234                  -0.052                     
t-stat -0.698  -0.688  -0.723  -0.754                  -0.204                     
UBR -0.005  0.000  0.000  0.001                      0.003                 
t-stat -0.737  0.061  -0.030  0.169                      0.661                 
UD 0.002  -0.001  0.000  0.000                          0.001             
t-stat 0.402  -0.123  -0.049  -0.024                          0.155             
HIGHCORP 0.023  0.218  0.210  0.263                              0.120         
t-stat 0.078  0.752  0.722  1.009                              0.935         
LOWCORP -0.069  0.122  0.108  0.204                                  -0.071     
t-stat -0.148  0.279  0.250  0.557                                  -0.500     
D_TOT 6.687*  5.934  5.766  5.977*                                      5.618** 
t-stat 1.729  1.660  1.619  1.778                                      2.134 
c -0.202      0.205  0.211  0.385***  0.262**  0.277  0.010  0.408**  0.286*  0.350*  0.321***  0.405***  0.485*** 
t-stat -0.440      0.406  0.488  3.722  2.173  0.822  0.048  2.271  1.666  1.895  3.135  4.057  7.179 
t1     0.313                                                 
t-stat      0.530                                                 
t2     0.229                                                 
t-stat     0.439                                                 
t3     -0.319  -0.534*  -0.574***  -0.522***  -0.512***  -0.482**  -0.434***  -0.523***  -0.531***  -0.513***  -0.560***  -0.542***  -0.569*** 
t-stat     -0.653  -1.980  -3.197  -3.463  -2.794  -2.383  -2.885  -3.467  -2.658  -3.136  -2.838  -3.501  -3.223 
adj R2  0.293  0.358  0.377  0.414  0.328  0.349  0.329  0.391  0.328  0.336  0.328  0.343  0.332  0.447 
n 40  40  40  40  40  40  40  40  40  40  40  40  40  40 
HC SE  yes yes yes yes no yes no no no yes no yes no yes
Note: *, **, and *** refer to statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. ME = indicator for monetary easing; ALMP = spending on active labour market policy per unemployed to GDP per 
capita; EPL = employment protection legislation; HIGHCORP = dummy for countries with high corporatism in the wage-bargaining system; LOWCORP = dummy for countries with low corporatism in the 
wage-bargaining system; PMR = product market regulation; TW = tax wedge; UBD = unemployment benefit duration; UBR = average unemployment benefit replacement rate; UD = union density; d_TOT = 
change in relative prices of imports weighted by the share of imports in GDP; adj R2 = adjusted R-squared; n = number of observations; HC SE = estimated with White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard 
errors. Estimated with E-Views 5.1 Table 2: Determinants of the degree of hysteresis in different variations 
  Variation 1  Variation 2  Variation 3  Variation 4  Variation 5
  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  
ME  0.343 *  0.377**  0.785**  0.849*** 0.291  0.357*  0.413 **  0.455**  0.662***
t-stat 1.994    2.284  2.553  2.911  1.373  1.797  2.110   2.459  3.899 
ALMP  -0.002   -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  0.000  0.000  0.000   0.000  -0.002 
t-stat -0.503    -0.447  -0.307  -0.396  0.003  0.093  -0.006   -0.031  -0.637 
EPL  -0.027   0.081  0.034  0.093  -0.014  0.078  0.093   0.169*  -0.436* 
t-stat -0.187    1.121  0.266  1.151  -0.095  0.855  0.630   1.900  -1.350 
PMR  0.070       0.080      0.095      0.102       0.340 
t-stat 0.601        0.820      0.881      1.036       1.808 
TW  0.011       0.003      0.007      0.003       0.007 
t-stat 0.879        0.294      0.53      0.259       0.305 
UBD -0.301    -0.318  -0.238  -0.249  -0.225 -0.221  -0.421   -0.456 -0.111 
t-stat -0.847    -0.923  -0.700  -0.802  -0.629  -0.629  -1.295   -1.432  -0.120 
UBR  -0.006   -0.003  -0.002  0.000  0.001  0.005  0.005   0.008  -0.014 
t-stat -0.844    -0.582  -0.233  0.039  0.117  0.598  0.553   1.037  -1.009 
UD  0.002   0.003  0.000  0.001  0.000  0.001  -0.002   -0.001  -0.034** 
t-stat 0.386    0.589  0.018  0.217  0.031  0.216  -0.346   -0.164  -2.157 
HIGHCORP  0.096   0.206  0.193  0.250  0.269  0.385  0.341   0.427     
t-stat 0.313    0.773  0.605  0.846  0.776  1.232  1.048   1.457     
LOWCORP  -0.024   0.165  0.052  0.134  0.224  0.398  0.418   0.551     
t-stat -0.058    0.502  0.109  0.317  0.477  0.993  0.920   1.439     
D_TOT  5.394   5.197  8.322**  7.914**  3.57  2.630  5.822 *  5.001*  6.756* 
t-stat 1.386    1.534  2.227  2.242  1.088  0.906  1.967   1.848  1.853 
c  0.137   0.306  0.124  0.326  -0.329  -0.140  -0.447   -0.246  0.542***
t-stat 0.269    0.710  0.221  0.649  -0.614  -0.296  -0.895   -0.548  4.893 
t3 -0.382    -0.545**  -0.500 -0.651*** -0.327  -0.519**  -0.318   -0.491**  -0.551***
t-stat -1.223    -2.468  -1.672  -3.068  -1.144  -2.485  -1.235   -2.557  -3.396 
adj  R2  0.189   0.214  0.275  0.307  0.137  0.166  0.217   0.240  0.492 
n 40  ***  40*** 40*** 40*** 40 *** 40*** 41  *** 41*** 40***
HC SE  yes  yes yes yes yes no no  no yes
Note: *, **, and *** refer to statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. ME = indicator for monetary easing; 
ALMP = spending on active labour market policy per unemployed to GDP per capita; EPL = employment protection legislation; 
HIGHCORP = dummy for countries with high corporatism in the wage-bargaining system; LOWCORP = dummy for countries with 
low corporatism in the wage-bargaining system; PMR = product market regulation; TW = tax wedge; UBD = unemployment benefit 
duration; UBR = average unemployment benefit replacement rate; UD = union density; d_TOT = change in relative prices of imports 
weighted by the share of imports in GDP; adj R2 = adjusted R-squared; n = number of observations; HC SE = estimated with White 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. Estimated with E-Views 5.1 10  Appendix 
 
Table A.1: Pooled cross section data used for the regression analysis 
Country 
Beginning of 





Australia 1981q4  0,11  -0,60  11,36 0,90 4,02 13,90 1,01 22,26 47,96  1,00  0,00  0,01 
Belgium 1980q4  0,43  -0,22  25,47 3,20 5,48 37,50 0,86 44,13 52,12  1,00  0,00  0,14 
Canada 1980q2  0,10  -0,23  12,00 0,80 4,31 13,30 0,33 18,60 35,84  0,00  1,00  -0,02 
Switzerland 1981q4  -0,19  -0,41  41,94 1,10 4,17 20,20 0,33 12,72 29,75  1,00  0,00  -0,07 
Denmark 1980q1  0,29  -0,60  36,87 2,30 5,52 34,70 0,70 55,20 80,21  1,00  0,00  0,04 
Finland 1980q4  -0,14  -0,47  34,24 2,30 5,40 34,96 0,77 24,45 68,42  1,00  0,00  0,04 
United Kingdom  1980q1  0,64  -0,38  13,71 0,60 4,47 29,90 0,78 22,96 48,72  0,00  1,00  0,00 
Ireland 1982q4  0,76  0,98  23,53 0,90 5,70 25,85 0,57 30,22 56,12  0,00  1,00  0,08 
Ireland 1985q4  1,48  1,25  23,87 0,90 5,48 29,54 0,60 29,01 51,62  0,00  1,00  -0,03 
Italy 1982q1  0,67  -0,11  3,33  3,60 5,83 41,70 0,33 0,60 46,69  0,00  1,00  0,08 
Netherlands 1980q1  0,46  -0,59  29,14 2,70 5,56 41,60 0,73 47,67 32,78  1,00  0,00  0,05 
New Zealand  1982q4  0,60  0,39  50,09 0,90 4,53 17,48 1,03 31,40 64,46  1,00  0,00  0,06 
Portugal 1983q1  -0,65  -0,13  8,98  4,10 5,92 27,51 0,33 7,18 57,79  0,00  0,00  0,16 
United  States  1980q2  -0,07  0,04 7,60 0,20 2,83 25,90 0,44 14,19 20,23 0,00  1,00  0,04 
Australia 1990q2  0,30  -0,32  7,40  0,90 3,93 14,90 1,01 25,51 40,50  1,00  0,00  -0,02 
Belgium 1992q4  0,13  -0,35  24,27 3,20 4,55 38,60 0,86 40,39 54,98  1,00  0,00  -0,10 
Canada 1990q2  0,06  -0,83  12,59 0,80 2,68 17,30 0,33 19,25 32,92  0,00  1,00  -0,08 
Switzerland 1990q3  0,23  -0,45  21,15 1,10 4,17 18,00 0,33 21,92 22,65  1,00  0,00  -0,15 
Germany 1995q4  0,74  -0,22  33,13 3,09 3,29 35,00 0,73 26,01 27,75  1,00  0,00  -0,04 
Denmark 1987q1  0,36  -0,20  36,10 2,30 5,52 35,50 0,68 49,40 74,97  1,00  0,00  -0,05 
Denmark 1990q3  -0,02  -0,02  24,62 2,30 4,73 32,50 0,69 51,90 75,78  1,00  0,00  -0,07 
Spain 1992q4  -0,15  -0,61  5,44  3,80 4,47 32,90 0,49 31,67 17,96  0,00  0,00  -0,10 
Finland 1990q2  0,30  -0,27  60,04 2,30 4,62 34,60 0,62 36,35 72,25  1,00  0,00  -0,06 
France 1992q2  0,31  -0,36  23,29 3,00 5,16 38,20 0,64 37,64 10,18  0,00  0,00  -0,04 
United Kingdom  1990q3  -0,21 -0,27  12,00 0,60 2,78 23,70 0,79 18,14 37,22  0,00  1,00  -0,07 
Italy 1992q2  0,32  -0,31  5,87  3,60 5,68 42,60 1,09 9,60 38,87  0,00  1,00  -0,06 
Japan 1993q2  0,21  -0,23  21,85 2,12 3,31 16,00 0,33 9,92 24,34  1,00  0,00  -0,04 
New Zealand  1991q1  0,33  -0,62  17,59 0,90 3,33 20,85 1,03 30,43 44,44  0,00  1,00  -0,05 
Portugal 1992q3  0,05  -0,46  31,82 3,85 5,12 25,32 0,54 35,39 28,58  0,00  0,00  -0,07 
Sweden 1990q2  0,33  -0,24  173,73 3,50 4,36 43,40 0,33 29,16 80,02  0,00  0,00  0,00 
United States  1990q4  -0,24 -0,40  6,36  0,20 2,29 24,80 0,48 11,10 15,47  0,00  1,00  0,03 
Belgium 2002q4  0,06  -0,36  30,51 2,20 2,13 39,10 0,90 42,15 55,76  1,00  0,00  -0,11 
Switzerland 1998q4  -0,55  -0,23  39,89 1,10 3,25 17,80 0,50 37,25 20,96  1,00  0,00  -0,21 
Switzerland 2002q3  -0,01  -0,19  29,98 1,10 2,79 17,50 0,44 33,12 21,48  1,00  0,00  -0,23 
Germany 2002q4  -0,25  -0,20  29,18 2,35 1,74 33,40 0,72 27,20 23,22  1,00  0,00  -0,06 
Ireland 2001q2  -1,15  0,04  67,33 0,90 3,54 12,80 1,00 35,84 35,92  1,00  0,00  -0,16 
Japan 1997q2  0,39  0,04  16,46 2,00 3,11 15,60 0,33 10,81 22,79  1,00  0,00  -0,04 
Japan 2001q2  0,35  0,07  10,58 1,80 2,38 20,40 0,33 9,13 20,88  1,00  0,00  -0,04 
New Zealand  1997q4  -1,17 -0,48  16,83 0,90 2,00 14,82 1,01 28,28 22,34  0,00  1,00  -0,09 
Portugal 2002q3  0,18  -0,14  30,36 3,70 2,58 23,69 0,59 40,81 23,43  0,00  0,00  -0,16 
H = degree of hysteresis; ME = indicator for monetary easing; ALMP = spending on active labour market policy per 
unemployed to GDP per capita; UBD = unemployment benefit duration; UBR = average unemployment benefit replacement 
rate; EPL = employment protection legislation; PMR = product market regulation; CB = collective bargaining coverage; TW = 
tax wedge; UD = union density; d_TOT = change in relative prices of imports weighted by the share of imports in GDP 





CORP PMR TW UBD UBR UD D_TOT
ALMP 1.000 0.193 0.143 -0.360 0.083 0.235 -0.066 0.300 0.433 0.003
EPL 0.193 1.000 -0.016 -0.451 0.433 0.653 -0.095 0.170 0.180 -0.133
HIGHCORP 0.143 -0.016 1.000 -0.727 -0.046 -0.064 0.164 0.322 0.192 0.101
LOWCORP -0.360 -0.451 -0.727 1.000 -0.080 -0.090 0.022 -0.414 -0.126 0.093
PMR 0.083 0.433 -0.046 -0.080 1.000 0.476 0.027 0.184 0.549 -0.289
TW 0.235 0.653 -0.064 -0.090 0.476 1.000 0.092 0.295 0.411 0.137
UBD -0.066 -0.095 0.164 0.022 0.027 0.092 1.000 0.390 0.243 0.185
UBR 0.300 0.170 0.322 -0.414 0.184 0.295 0.390 1.000 0.384 0.230
UD 0.433 0.180 0.192 -0.126 0.549 0.411 0.243 0.384 1.000 -0.103
D_TOT 0.003 -0.133 0.101 0.093 -0.289 0.137 0.185 0.230 -0.103 1.000
ALMP = spending on active labour market policy per unemployed to GDP per capita; EPL = employment protection 
legislation; HIGHCORP = dummy for countries with high corporatism in the wage-bargaining system; LOWCORP = dummy 
for countries with low corporatism in the wage-bargaining system; PMR = product market regulation; TW = tax wedge; UBD = 
unemployment benefit duration; UBR = average unemployment benefit replacement rate; UD = union density; d_TOT = 
change in relative prices of imports weighted by the share of imports in GDP. Estimated with E-Views 5.1Table A.3: Determinants of the degree of hysteresis in variation 3 
  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  
ME 0.356 **  0.348  *  0.328   0.320   0.366 *  0.401 ** 0.363  **  0.419 *  0.364 **  0.335 * 
t-stat 2.155   1.668    1.593   1.515   1.832   2.017   2.224    1.910   2.156   1.722  
ALMP 0.001                                      
t-stat 0.250                                      
EPL     0.011                                   
t-stat     0.170                                   
PMR         0.066                              
t-stat         0.938                              
TW             0.010 **                        
t-stat             2.083                          
UBD                 0.073                      
t-stat                 0.256                      
UBR                     0.006                  
t-stat                     1.073                  
UD                         0.003               
t-stat                         0.926               
HIGHCORP                             0.185          
t-stat                             1.295          
LOWCORP                                 -0.047      
t-stat                                 -0.303      
D_TOT                                     3.503  
                                     0.992  
c 0.332 *** 0.324  **  0.044   0.051   0.305   0.207   0.197    0.278 **  0.368 *** 0.398 ***
t-stat 2.997   1.993    0.153   0.259   1.399   1.121   1.056    2.085   3.260   4.314  
t3 -0.517 *** -0.512  ***  -0.388   -0.442 ** -0.517 ** -0.532 ** -0.456  **  -0.575 *** -0.527 *** -0.537 ***
t-stat -3.157   -2.586    -1.659   -2.380   -2.535   -2.535   -2.622    -2.769   -3.127   -2.864  
adj R2  0.211   0.210    0.227   0.247   0.211   0.234   0.228    0.243   0.211   0.258  
n 40   40    40   40   40   40   40    40   40   40  
HC  SE  no yes   yes yes yes yes no   yes no yes
Note: *, **, and *** refer to statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. ME = indicator for monetary easing; ALMP = spending on active labour market policy per 
unemployed to GDP per capita; EPL = employment protection legislation; HIGHCORP = dummy for countries with high corporatism in the wage-bargaining system; LOWCORP = dummy for 
countries with low corporatism in the wage-bargaining system; PMR = product market regulation; TW = tax wedge; UBD = unemployment benefit duration; UBR = average unemployment benefit 
replacement rate; UD = union density; d_TOT = change in relative prices of imports weighted by the share of imports in GDP; adj R2 = adjusted R-squared; n = number of observations; HC SE = 
estimated with White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. Estimated with E-Views 5.1  
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